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Bratton et al.: Book Reviews

BOOK REVIEWS

PLUS ÇA CHANGE, PLUS C’EST LA MÊME CHOSE
TORCH: North Africa and the Allied Path to Victory, by Vincent P. O’Hara. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute
Press, 2015. 384 pages. $49.95.

In the literary mountain of scholarship,
research, and writing devoted to World
War II, the story of Operation TORCH,
the Allied landings in North Africa in
November of 1942, is presented often as
something of an overture to the massive
amphibious symphonies that followed.
Accounts may include some discussion
of Eisenhower’s growing facility for
strategic leadership, the byzantine nature
of Vichy and Free French politics, and
the gradual emergence of Charles de
Gaulle as the leader of Free France. The
landings themselves all too often have
been presented as hinting of a Kabuki
production, if not of opéra bouffe, with
a few desultory shots fired to assuage
Gallic honor, followed by capitulation.
Then, it seems, the real war begins,
moving down dusty roads to Kasserine,
the initial blooding of the U.S. Army,
the rise of Patton and Bradley, and the
inexorable sweep of operations to Sicily,
the Italian mainland, and eventually the
beaches and hedgerows of Normandy.
Vincent O’Hara has done much to
correct this impression and to give
TORCH the attention it deserves.
Readers will come away with a much
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better understanding of the difficulties
faced by both the French defenders and
the Allied invaders and the political
currents that swirled about the operation
from the very beginning—and with
an appreciation for how the results
could have been very different.
As O’Hara points out, 1942 was a
parlous time for the Allies. Axis
armies were cutting deep into the
Soviet Union, and fear that it would
drop out of the war was palpable. U.S.
leaders, particularly George Marshall,
eschewed what might be considered
military sideshows and argued for a
rapid buildup of force in Great Britain,
followed by a cross-channel invasion
at the earliest opportunity. The British,
led by Churchill and scarred by their
experience in World War I, preferred
less direct approaches, avoiding the U.S.favored direct attack until victory was
assured. TORCH represented a victory
for British planners and a setback for
Marshall. This is among the betterknown elements of the North African
campaign, and O’Hara does it justice
without dwelling overlong on the topic.
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In contrast, French politics usually
are, for the most part, underexamined,
and O’Hara provides a valuable
understanding of French actors and
motives. His examination of Marshal
Pétain’s efforts to end the German
occupation and restore France to
something approaching its former status
is both convincing and useful. So too
is O’Hara’s meticulous description of
French forces, plans, and readiness in
North Africa on the eve of invasion.
O’Hara’s discussion of invasion
planning and preparation and the
movement to the various landing
beaches is excellent. Although dwarfed
by later invasions, TORCH required
a major effort at a time when Allied
amphibious resources were extremely
limited. Scheduling convoys, arranging
for carrier-based air support, and
coping with potentially lethal surf
conditions all foreshadowed difficulties
that would have to be overcome in later
amphibious operations. The plan was
audacious. Allied forces were to carry
out five simultaneous and geographically separated landings on the Atlantic
and Mediterranean shores of North
Africa, then race to Tunis to trap
German forces in Africa and deny those
forces additional support from Europe.
Accomplishing this would bring the
Mediterranean under much greater Allied control, and the Axis might have to
take some pressure off the Soviet Union
to deal with the new threat to the south.
As O’Hara makes clear, French
resistance, while affected by conflicting orders on whether to take Allied
troops under fire, was not a token
effort, although the loss of only 1,700
Allied wounded and killed may have
contributed to this impression. Although

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol70/iss3/11

NWC_Summer2017Review.indb 147

B O O K R E V I E WS

147

ill equipped and often outnumbered,
French forces, including colonial auxiliaries and units of the Foreign Legion,
fought well. While some French units
offered no resistance, they did so in obedience to orders from their commanders. O’Hara details the action on each
of the five invasion beaches in detail.
The naval battle of Casablanca was, as
O’Hara describes it, “the largest surface,
air, and subsurface naval action fought
in the Atlantic Ocean during World War
II.” The battle, which lasted six hours,
featured naval gunfire duels between
USS Massachusetts and the disabled
French battleship Jean Bart. French
shore batteries engaged U.S. warships
and French combatants shelled Allied
landing craft en route to the invasion
beaches. French officers handled their
ships with courage and daring, and they
came close to engaging the Allied troop
transports. Maps are provided, greatly
aiding the reader’s understanding of
how the battle was conducted. There
was also a naval engagement off Oran,
and Italian and German aircraft and
submarines conducted significant
antishipping actions as the campaign
wore on. O’Hara illustrates that, far
from being an Allied walkover, the
possibility of TORCH resulting in a
disaster at sea was much more likely
than is normally acknowledged.
A greater appreciation of TORCH by
students of amphibious warfare is warranted. Many of the problems associated
with projecting power from the sea were
identified during this campaign. The
role of beachmasters, the timing and
coordination of shore bombardment,
and the logistical difficulties associated with landing supplies on an open
beach in high surf all were factors. At
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times the lessons learned were small,
such as the discovery that landing net
rungs spaced too far apart posed a
significant danger to debarking troops.
Some elements of the TORCH landings
touch on current questions. For example,
although the Saint-Nazaire and Dieppe
raids had demonstrated previously the
inherent difficulty in conducting an
amphibious assault on built-up areas,
TORCH would feature several efforts
along these lines. The most dramatic of
these was an attempt to land U.S. troops
from HMS Walney and HMS Hartland
(the former U.S. Coast Guard cutters
Sebago and Pontchartrain, respectively)
directly onto the moles of Oran Harbor.
Both vessels quickly were identified as
hostile and ran an intense gauntlet of
French fire until sunk. In contrast, an
attempt was made to sail USS Dallas, a
vintage destroyer carrying seventy-five
specially trained assault troops, six miles
up Port Lyautey’s Wadi Sebou waterway
to carry out an attack on a critically important all-weather airfield. The effort,
despite experiencing significant delays,
succeeded. In an ever-urbanizing world,
the viability of direct amphibious assaults may be open to debate once again.
O’Hara rightfully points out that TORCH,
in the main, failed to deliver hoped-for
results. It would take five months to
achieve victory in North Africa, not the
three weeks anticipated. The operation
did nothing to ease the plight of the
Soviet Union and the Mediterranean
remained contested waters. The African
campaign drew men, matériel, and
shipping away from efforts to support
a direct invasion of Europe. TORCH
resulted in the total occupation of
France by Germany and the intentional
scuttling of the French fleet at Toulon.
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None of these results, according to
O’Hara, inflicted real loss on Italy and
Germany. However, in the opportunity
to identify and resolve amphibious
challenges and as a beginning to the
development of a truly combined
strategic command, TORCH was of
value. If, as O’Hara claims, TORCH also
ensured that France would not become
a true ally of Germany, the strategic
benefit may have been significant.
TORCH sheds some welcome light on
a campaign that too often is passed
over. Scholars and lay readers alike will
find the book useful. While O’Hara
has performed yeoman service in
providing this detailed account of the
amphibious portion of the campaign,
perhaps his greatest contribution
is to restore the reputation of naval
forces that, far from offering token
resistance, fought with courage and
tenacity, often against superior odds.
RICHARD J. NORTON

How the War Was Won: Air-Sea Power and Allied Victory in World War II, by Phillips Payson
O’Brien. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge Univ.
Press, 2015. 640 pages. $35.

This book provides a detailed reexamination of the main contributory factors
leading to Allied victory in World War
II. In many ways the book’s argument
is not so much new as it is a revision
of the revisionists. During the Cold
War the narrative was largely that the
Western Allies had triumphed over
Germany and Japan with some help
from the Soviet Union. That narrative
was challenged at the time, and with
more success after the end of the Cold
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War by revisionist historians who
placed an increased emphasis on the
role of Soviet ground and air forces in
the defeat of Germany. The Russian
front, it was argued, was where the
bulk of Germany’s forces was engaged
and, as far as the revisionist narrative
went, defeated by the Soviet Union. Dr.
O’Brien, a reader at the University of
Glasgow, challenges that argument with
a wealth of data and looks at the war in
more global terms. He argues that the air
and sea forces of the United States and
the British Empire played the decisive
role by preventing “the Germans and
Japanese from moving” (p. 16).
How the War Was Won provides a broad
array of detailed information discussing
the enormous industrial contribution
of all sides. Indeed, the author’s analysis
of all this information makes a compelling case for his argument. Yet there is
something missing: it is difficult to see
the link between cause and effect. One
can see such a link better regarding the
war against Japan, but in the case of the
war in Europe the author does not show
clearly the link he claims between air
and sea power causing immense damage
to Germany’s war economy and Soviet
troops wandering around Berlin in 1945.
I suspect that the Soviet forces’ killing
and wounding of millions of German
combat troops might have something to
do with this, for without the physical removal of German soldiers from the Soviet Union’s route to Berlin Hitler might
not have felt the need to commit suicide.
Now, there is no denying that Allied
air and sea power contributed to Allied
victory in Europe; the argument seems
to be to what extent they did so. Thus,
this book is welcome for the depth of
detail it provides as fodder for such a
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debate. That this reviewer is not entirely
convinced of the author’s arguments
does not make this a bad book; it is in
fact a very good book, and an extremely
welcome addition to the literature on
World War II. It provides an enormous
amount of information and analysis
about the role of air and sea power,
which furthers our understanding of
the reasons for Allied success. That it
causes the questioning of the current
orthodoxy is to be applauded, as
greater understanding often results
from challenges to the status quo.
This book should prove of great benefit
to advanced students of World War
II, and it is particularly pertinent for
specialists interested in current U.S.
national security needs. Given the
friction that exists among the United
States, China, and Russia, the book
provides an opportunity to think about
how the U.S. armed services should
structure their forces for any future
conflict with these potential adversaries.
Dr. O’Brien’s book should be read by
any sailor, marine, or airman invested
in a budget fight, because “the only way
to ‘win’ a war is to stop your enemy
from moving” (p. 488). That argument
seems a particularly pertinent one when
looking at the problems of Southeast
Asia or the Baltic or Black Sea regions.
NICHOLAS MURRAY

A Military History of Japan: From the Age of the
Samurai to the 21st Century, by John T. Kuehn.
Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2014. 299 pages. $75.

Japan is at an inflection point. Depending on how particular peoples and
nations view this enigmatic country, it
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now either is turning away from rightly
enforced demilitarization and back
toward the more martial and expansionist policies of its past, or is working to
become a security provider concomitant
with its economic power. A Military
History of Japan is therefore a timely
work that will add studied moderation
and critical analysis to the argument
regarding the path on which the country
is located now and down which it
is likely to progress in the future.
This book goes well beyond a traditional
historical narrative. The author follows Japan from its origin myths up
to the present time, adding elements
of geographic determinism and
cultural anthropology as well as his own
experiences. The military and warfare
aspects obviously receive the most
focus, but they are not, and perhaps
cannot be, separated from the overall
history of the country and culture.
In the first chapter, “From Sun Goddess
to Samurai,” the author helps explain
Japan’s nature by telling its creation story
and examining how landscape, climate,
outside influences, and internal competition shaped Japanese development and
societal worldview. Around the eighth
century CE, when that first chapter concludes, the seminal samurai culture, and
an overall Japanese culture distinct from
those of neighboring Korea and China,
is in place, one the author argues still
manifests itself in Japanese society.
The following chapters chronicle the
subsequent maturation of Japan’s
political and military power structure.
The many accounts of royal machinations and specific battles may confuse
or lose those not well versed in Japanese
geography or language, but those the
author includes do add to the story of
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how and why Japan’s military evolved as
it did. These middle chapters also shed
light on the Japanese military’s actions
during the first half of the twentieth century, and on the still-tense relationship
between Japan and its neighbors, much
of that distrust predating World War II.
The Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese
Wars get ample attention and analysis,
as does the very calculated, top-down
manner in which Japan’s post-samurai
military attempted to imitate the best
militaries of contemporary Europe.
The “Great East Asian War” chapter
may not cover much new ground for
those readers with more-than-standard
knowledge of World War II. But in
“After the Samurai,” the book’s final
pages tie in themes present in Japan
for at least 1,200 years. They provide
an excellent argument that Japan’s
future will be determined by the same
geographic, cultural, and geostrategic
influences that have shaped its past.
The author is a retired naval aviator and
a professor at the Army Command and
General Staff College. He spent time
living in Japan both as a dependent
child in the mid-twentieth century and
later as a Navy officer. These experiences give him insights different from
those expected from either a pure
academic analyst or a strategist viewing
the country simply as an unsinkable
aircraft carrier. He effectively intersperses personal and family recollections
with more-standard history to give
better descriptions of cultural norms
and practices, as when he writes about
Japanese rioters sending teams ahead
to warn citizens, including his parents,
to stay indoors for their own safety.
For the casual reader, A Military History
of Japan functions as a needed update
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to Ruth Benedict’s much-maligned
yet still-influential 1946 work The
Chrysanthemum and the Sword, a
general primer on the seemingly
contradictory forces driving this global
power. For those with a professional
interest in the country and its region,
this book is a must-read, an enlightening
facilitator in the current debate over
Japan’s place in Asia and the world.
J. OVERTON

Flash Points: The Emerging Crisis in Europe, by
George Friedman. New York: Doubleday, 2015.
288 pages. $28.95.

Flash Points is both an elegant and a
disturbing book. Not simply elegant
in its writing style, which is direct and
clear, but also in its initial discussion of
the age of discovery and enlightenment
that propelled the European nations
into becoming world powers—you
rarely find a more cogent and concise
explanation of the roots of European
social, cultural, political, and economic
development. Yet the book is also very
disturbing because it details how the
factors that allowed Europe to transform
the world—faith, individualism, scientific inquiry, ideas of self-determination
and legal rights, and nationalism—also
contributed to the almost unfathomable
destruction of the two world wars that
tore it apart. George Friedman details
the region’s history, current events, and
potential future in a way that makes
an admonishment from his father, a
Hungarian Jewish survivor of both the
Nazis and the Soviets, seem very true:
“Europe will never change. It will just
act as if nothing happened” (p. 23).
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Freidman, the well-known founder of
Stratfor.com, one of the first private
intelligence firms to be a major presence on the web, and an author of
prescient books on the future security
environment, begins with the personal
history of how and why his family escaped Hungary in 1949. Having
survived the horrors of World War
II and the Communist takeover in a
weak, dependent, and occupied nation,
Friedman’s father wanted his family
to go to America and “live in a strong
country with weak neighbors and, if
possible, no Nazis, communists, or
anyone else who believed in anything
deeply enough to want to kill him
and his family over it” (p. 17). His
view—that a humane peace in Europe
always would be a mere interlude—sets
the scenario for the rest of the book.
This fear is, of course, what spurred the
creation of the European Union (EU).
Friedman analyzes the weaknesses
of the EU and the sources of conflict
throughout Europe, particularly in a
situation in which NATO’s perceived
importance has diminished, and
concludes that the centripetal forces of
geopolitics are just too strong. It is not
just the potential collapse of the euro; it
is the fact that national identities cannot
be supplanted by a European identity
without destroying a cultural diversity
established over millennia. The fact that
the EU appeared to achieve some small
success in cultivating a cosmopolitan
Europeanness is, in Friedman’s view,
merely a veneer that a U.S. commitment
to defending a cold peace under unique
historical circumstances made possible.
Those circumstances have devolved.
With the controlling pressures
removed, Yugoslavia—perhaps the
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greatest attempt at fusing otherwise
hostile nationalities—exploded into
violence until all sides were exhausted
by fighting or concluded that opposing
NATO’s wishes was too costly. But that
was before a resurgent Russia could
intervene on behalf of the Serbs. Friedman’s book tours the other potential
flash points of Europe within a background where Russia is back, and the
geopolitical question of who will be the
hegemonic leader of Europe—France,
Germany, or Russia—has returned. It
is not ambition that drives; it is fear of
the power of the others (as Thucydides
described so many centuries ago). By
all measures, Germany would remain
the dominant power in economics, as
it is the economic engine of the EU
today. But it also is the power most
easily invaded from both east and west.
And it is growing impatient with the
seeming impossibility of creating an EU
that conforms to its view of necessary
order. The Germans, according to
Friedman, view themselves as the
victims of the EU/euro economic
crisis. What would it mean to the EU,
NATO, and specifically eastern Europe
if Germany were to cut a deal with
Russia to secure its own “permanent”
peace—secure to be the export
power it already is beyond Europe?
In Friedman’s view, the question of
Germany, Russia, and European peace
is one of national culture as well as
geopolitics: “For the Germans, success
and disaster are intimately linked, so
they are simultaneously afraid of what
they have achieved and tremendously
proud of it. . . . They do not aspire
to lead a new Europe. They fear that
they cannot escape the role. The rest
of Europe harbors suspicions that
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Germany’s public fears and modesty are
feigned, that in the end the old Germany
has never died but has merely been
asleep” (p. 153). Add in Russian pressure
and the fact that post–Cold War
Germany is united, and the European
foundation seems a lot less stable.
Even if the European powers never
are moved to conflict with each other,
Friedman’s conclusion is that the situation can make the continent safe for
ethnic breakups, with all the resulting
potential for wars—or perhaps hybrid
wars and gray-zone conflicts—to
occur. Russia will be the first to take
advantage of that, prompting others to
do the same. He predicts that “Europe’s
history of conflict is far from over. . . .
[I]n many places Europe’s anger against
other Europeans is still there” (p. 251).
Ultimately, Friedman sees the future still
controlled by Europe’s “Faustian spirit”
that “haunted its greatest moment, the
Enlightenment,” defined as “the desire
to possess everything even at the cost of
their souls,” and today “everything at no
cost” (p. 257). By “everything,” he means
national sovereignty without the exercise
of national sovereignty; wealth distribution without work distribution; a world
in which they can feel like the hegemon
but not have to be it; a world in which
wars would stop without intervention; and, perhaps worst of all, ethnic
nationalism without its implications.
What can be done to prevent growing
conflicts? Friedman flirts with the fact
that America today is still as powerful
as it was when it put out “the European
fire in 1918 and 1945” and contained
it during the Cold War. But can it do
so in the future? Should it do so in the
future, or do the fires need to burn

7

4/21/17 8:35 AM

Naval War College Review, Vol. 70 [2017], No. 3, Art. 11

themselves out? Friedman is not sure,
but he does give us a disturbing prospect
about which we need to think deeply.
SAM J. TANGREDI

The End of the Asian Century: War, Stagnation,
and the Risks to the World’s Most Dynamic Region,
by Michael R. Auslin. New Haven, CT: Yale Univ.
Press, 2017. 304 pages. $30.

The signature foreign policy move,
and greatest strategic insight, of Barack
Obama’s presidency was “the pivot”—
later renamed “the rebalance”—to the
Asia-Pacific region. President Obama’s
initiative grew out of his conviction that
Asia had become the most important
region in terms of economic dynamism,
explosive demographic growth, and
growing military tensions. And if one
broadens the geography and semantics
to include India—yielding the “IndoPacific”—this makes utter sense, since
the region claims 60 percent of the
world’s population, nearly 40 percent of
total global economic output, some of
the fastest-growing and most capable
militaries, and three nuclear states. No
surprise, then, that the Obama White
House argued in a November 2015 fact
sheet that this region “is increasingly the
world’s political and economic center of
gravity.” Or, as top Asia expert and diplomat Kurt M. Campbell astutely wrote
in The Pivot: The Future of American
Statecraft in Asia, “[T]he lion’s share of
the history of the twenty-first century
will be written in Asia” (pp. 1, 344).
While the Obama administration
made a compelling case for the logic
of pivoting to Asia—that is, elevating
the time, attention, and resources
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given to the region relative to other
parts of the world—the results were
uneven. Washington reinvigorated its
diplomacy in the region, strengthened
commitments with U.S. treaty allies,
forged relationships with new partners
such as Burma, began shifting military
assets to the region, and negotiated
a far-reaching trade deal intended to
deepen economic integration. But it also
failed to ratify that trade deal, suffered
significant political setbacks with treaty
allies Thailand and the Philippines,
was unable to counter Pyongyang’s
rush toward acquiring nuclear weapons
capable of reaching the United States,
and did little to restrain Chinese
maritime assertiveness and economic
and political coercion in the region.
How then should one understand and
evaluate the myriad factors contributing
to Asia’s future? And are the risks to
the continued growth and stability of
the region now eclipsing the region’s
promise? These are the questions that
Michael Auslin, scholar in residence
at the American Enterprise Institute,
asks in his judicious, sobering, and
compelling new book The End of the
Asian Century. Auslin argues that Asia’s
future is significantly less assured than
is commonly held. As a longtime scholar
of, frequent traveler to, and trenchant
observer on the geopolitics of Asia, he
is positioned well to make such a case.
This book is far from a polemic; in
fact, Auslin approaches these questions
as a skeptic, describing how he in fact
originally held the opposite belief—that
the twenty-first century inevitably
looked to be an Asian century. Yet
through repeated trips to the region and
multiple meetings with senior policy
makers, businessmen, and military
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officers, he became convinced that risk
rather than opportunity was the most
salient feature of the Asian political,
economic, and military landscape. He
argues that U.S. policy makers have been
overly optimistic about opportunities in
the region and insufficiently attentive to
risks, thereby warping U.S. perception of
regional trends and causing the United
States to pursue misguided policies.
This book is Auslin’s attempt to introduce a framework to assess risks in Asia
properly, across five major categories.
These include threats to Asia’s growth
from the end of its economic miracle
and the failure to implement structural
macroeconomic reforms; demographic
pressures that will place increasing strain
on rapidly modernizing and urbanizing political and economic systems;
unfinished political revolutions that will
address these large-scale economic and
social dislocations; long-term historical
antagonism among various Asian states,
the lack of effective regional political
community among them, and the dearth
of effective institutions to mitigate crises;
and, most alarming, the growth of power
politics and the increasing potential for
war. The book’s organization follows
these categories, with chapters mapping
risk in each thematic domain. A final
chapter both summarizes and concludes
with a series of policy recommendations.
Auslin posits that as risk increases,
prudent investors take out more insurance. This advice is as relevant to nations
as to individual investors, and applies
across all the categories of risk contained
in the earlier sections of the book. In the
security realm, he argues for a concentric triangular approach, with an inner
core of states—Malaysia, the Philippines,
Indonesia, and Singapore—working
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closely with an outer core of the region’s
liberal-democratic heavyweights,
Australia, India, and Japan, to counter
an increasingly aggressive China.
Economically, he advocates for structural reforms within Asian nations and
trade liberalization among them. To
alleviate political instability, he pushes a
realistic democracy-promotion program.
To avoid isolating China, he promotes
an agenda for enhancing contact with
ordinary Chinese citizens. Linking all
these recommendations is a belief that
long-term stability in Asia is most likely
to flow from increased liberalization and
democratization, and that the United
States should have an indispensable
role as partner and catalyst in that
process. Absent American involvement,
investment, and leadership, short- and
long-term instability are likely to rise.
Auslin issues the caveat that his book is
not intended as a comprehensive guide
to all the countries in the region or all
the issues affecting them. And yet in just
222 pages his book manages to serve
not only as an excellent introduction
to the region but as an incisive guide to
understanding the contemporary risks
roiling the most consequential region of
the world. Extremely useful for national
security professionals, investors, and
interested observers alike, this book
moves beyond headline news to analysis
and advice in navigating the region’s
shifting geopolitical, demographic, and
economic landscape. Some will find
his recommendations too aggressive,
although his policy prescriptions explore
both costs and benefits. Others perhaps
will allege that Auslin is too bearish, too
gloomy on what many are expecting to
be the dawn of the Asian century. But,
given the acceleration of tensions in
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Asia, the demise of trade liberalization,
the erosion of democracy and advance
of autocratic rulers, and the doubts
the Trump administration has cast on
its commitment to alliances, we may
find that he was in fact too sanguine.
CHARLES EDEL

Warring Navies: India-Pakistan; Indian Navy’s
Role in the Indo-Pak Wars, by Ranji Rai and Joseph Chacko. Dombivli West, India: Frontier India Technology, 2014. 320 pages. $20.

Ranji Rai and Joseph Chacko’s book,
Warring Navies, is a welcome addition
to the scant coverage of the naval
history of South Asia. The authors are
a retired Indian navy commodore and
a defense journalist, respectively, and
the book draws heavily on Commodore
Rai’s experiences in the navy. The book
itself crosses the boundaries between
memoirs and popular history, covering
the history of the Indian navy’s operations from independence through the
end of the Cold War. It also includes
several stand-alone essays on various
topics related to maritime and regional
security by prominent retired Indian
military leaders, such as former army
chief Ved P. Malik, former navy chief
Vishnu Bhagwat, and Lieutenant
General C. Satish Nambiar. One of
the major strengths of the book is its
coverage of the many lesser-known uses
of the Indian navy (e.g., the liberation
of Goa in 1961 and the interventions
in the Maldives, Seychelles, and Sri
Lanka in the 1980s). It is particularly
useful for both Indian and non-Indian
readers to be aware of these past actions
today, as both India and its international
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partners debate India’s role as a security
provider in the Indian Ocean region.
The book is pitched toward a general
audience interested in military and
naval affairs in South Asia. The prose is
engaging and humorous, which makes
the book a quick read. For example,
the title for the chapter on the 1965
war—in which the Indian navy was not
particularly active—is “The Navy Does
Sweet Fanny Adams in 1965.” One of the
more interesting aspects of this book is
its use of various Indian, Pakistani, and
American autobiographies and memoirs
to interject vignettes from people
involved in the conflicts, ranging from
Indian naval officers to Pakistani leaders
and even to Henry Kissinger. These
provide insight into the perspectives of
participants in the events. The book’s
main strength is that it gives an insider’s
view on the challenges of joint operations for the Indian military. There are
some excellent examples, ranging from
air force and naval aviation in the 1965
war to amphibious operations in 1971
and smaller operations in the 1980s.
A couple of minor points detract from
the book. Given that it is a popular
history based on personal observations
and the memoirs of participants, some
of the general history of the conflicts
does reflect older interpretations and
narratives that are now debatable. The
book is not academically sourced and
does not have citations, so the reader is
left wondering whether the book would
have been improved if the authors had
engaged more with the work of recent
historians, such as Srinath Raghavan’s
excellent work on the 1971 war, or
even the classic histories of the Indian
navy done by Admirals Singh and
Hiranandani. Similarly, the book could
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have given greater attention to formatting and editing to improve its structure
and eliminate typographical errors that
distract the reader. In particular, the
intersection of long quotations from
other authors sometimes confuses the
narrative; perhaps some of these longer
passages could have been placed in an
appendix so the authors’ narrative would
not be interrupted. Last, some of the
additional essays by other authors do not
seem to fit within the theme of the book.
However, these shortcomings need to be
taken in context, given the nature of the
book and its intended audience. Readers
should keep in mind that the work
is intended to be neither a definitive
history nor an academic book, so they
should not expect it to engage with the
academic literature or offer extensive
footnoting. But for its intended audience
and modest ambitions, it does succeed
in bringing a valuable perspective with a
great deal of personal experience to the
reader in an approachable and readable
format. It will be of use to readers who
want more anecdotal details of the
history of naval operations and the naval
cultures of India and Pakistan, and those
who want a short overview of the naval
aspects of the conflicts in question.
PATRICK BRATTON

Vietnam Narratives and the Collective Memory
of the Vietnam War, by John A. Wood, War and
Society in North America series. Athens: Ohio
Univ. Press, 2016. 200 pages. $69.95.

More than forty years after the last U.S.
combat troops departed Vietnam in
1973, the conflict looms large in American popular culture and memory. Vivid

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2017

NWC_Summer2017Review.indb 156

depictions of guerrilla warfare, antiwar
protests, and psychologically troubled
veterans proliferate in print and film.
This was not always the case, however.
Silence followed in the immediate aftermath of the Vietnam War as veterans
and civilians alike grappled to forge
meaning from the long, costly intervention and ultimate American defeat. The
arrival of veteran-authored memoirs in
the late 1970s and the 1980s reignited
popular interest in the war and inspired
numerous others to follow suit. In subsequent decades, the gritty authenticity
of these best-selling narratives, written
by “those who were there,” profoundly
shaped American collective memory
and historical discourses about the war.
John A. Wood’s Vietnam Narratives and
the Collective Memory of the Vietnam
War aims to expose myriad misconceptions that have developed as a result.
Undertaking a comprehensive analysis
of the best-known Vietnam veteran
memoirs, Wood delineates the accuracies, omissions, and miscues inherent
in the genre to ascertain its overall
influence on American understanding of
the war. His methodology centers on the
collective analysis of fifty-eight Vietnam
veteran memoirs and oral histories
published between 1967 and 2005. He
supplements this primary set of texts
with films, newspapers, U.S. government
studies, historical scholarship, and
personal accounts from Vietnamese
civilians, African Americans, women
veterans, and other less prominent
authors. Wood’s primary argument
is that veteran narratives are subject
to the properties and limitations of
memory. Based on personal recollection
usually written long after the events in
question, memoirs necessarily provide
a fragmentary and biased perspective.
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Seven chapters ranging in topic from
author demographics to race, sex,
and postwar life illustrate this point.
Examining the backgrounds of the most
prominent authors, chapter 1 generates
a demographic profile for the typical
Vietnam-veteran memoirist: a collegeeducated, white, male officer. Although
enlisted personnel tended to be younger
and more-diverse working-class men,
Wood astutely notes that most veteranwriters were low-ranking officers whose
combat experiences were not only similar to but representative of those of the
men they commanded. Chapter 2 delves
into the authorial ambivalence common
to many veteran narratives, which
simultaneously disparage the military
mission and condemn Vietnamese civilians as duplicitous enemy collaborators
and greedy opportunists. Wood attempts
to rehabilitate popular perception of the
Vietnamese by justifying their behaviors
as the desperate actions of the inhabi
tants of a war-ravaged nation. Observing
a conspicuous absence of racial tensions
in the best-known Vietnam memoirs,
chapter 3 foregrounds the narratives
of nonwhite veterans as a race-centric
“countermemory” of the Vietnam War.
Wood’s analysis reveals two competing
paradigms: authors either highlight racial cooperation and pride in the combat
performance of their particular ethnic
groups or they underscore incidents of
white racism and express a separatist
racial ideology derived from the Black
Power movement. Women and sexuality are the focus of chapter 4, which
concedes that male soldiers generally
behaved in a sexist manner in their
interactions with Asian and American
women in Vietnam. Wood attributes the
prevailing misogynist attitude of American servicemen to mainstream and
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military cultures that emphasized sex
and promoted a general hostility toward
women. Chapter 5 debunks prevailing
myths about veterans’ homecomings
and postwar lives: first, that Vietnam
veterans suffered from post-traumatic
stress disorder at a greater rate than
soldiers who survived earlier wars;
second, that Vietnam veterans literally
were spat on by an ungrateful American
public on their return home. Chapter
6 underscores the ambivalent political
sentiment common to Vietnam veteran memoirs and concludes that such
characterizations accurately reflected
the views expressed in U.S. government
opinion polls. The final chapter tracks
numerous similarities between Vietnam
memoirs and narratives produced
by veterans of other American wars,
arguing that cross narrative parallels
reflect a consistent demographic among
authors as well as the fact that “combat
soldiers’ wartime experiences have not
changed in many fundamental ways
since at least the 1940s” (p. 109).
Wood’s desire to present a comprehensive analysis of the genre has produced a
volume that is both more superficial and
more repetitive than necessary. Wood
also overlooks the ways that memoirs
as a genre guide veterans’ selection of
stories to include. Memories are at once
distilled to a carefully curated collection,
embellished with expository detail and
context, and stitched together to form
a compelling narrative arc. Vietnam
veteran narratives not only inspired
and made acceptable “uncensored”
accounts but provided a model and
template for the types of stories that
should be featured. Noncombatant
veteran memoirs, for example, represent
a potentially rich, untapped vein of
information for scholars but almost
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certainly lack the high-intensity combat
usually considered “worthy” of retelling.
Although Wood’s research is voluminous, it relies heavily on published
materials. Archival records and
Vietnamese-language sources would
strengthen an already insightful analysis
of American veteran narratives and
their imprint on popular perception
of the war. Moreover, Wood’s reliance
on previous scholars’ works undercuts
his oft-repeated claim that the book
offers an overdue corrective to existing scholarship. Indeed, this slender
volume is directed not only to the casual
reader but to the professional historian.
According to Wood, Vietnam veteran
memoirs have received “inadequate
treatment” by literary scholars and
historians, who generally consider only a
small sample of texts and fail to distinguish fiction from nonfiction narratives.
He further charges that few military
historians scrutinize veteran-authored
texts. Yet Wood’s fundamental premise
that this book “is a work of history, but
it does not treat veteran memoirs as
sources that can be straightforwardly
mined for information” belies a naive
understanding of professional historical
practice (p. 5). Any responsible scholar
approaches her sources—archival and
secondary—with a professionally
critical eye.
Even so, this book would be an excellent
addition to an undergraduate military
history curriculum. Wood’s clear and
impressive synthesis of historical and
literary scholarship provides a useful
introduction to the critical study of
Vietnam veteran memoirs. Interested
readers will want to supplement Wood’s
book with fine-grain examinations such
as David Kieran’s Forever Vietnam: How
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a Divisive War Changed American Public
Memory, Thomas Myers’s Walking Point:
American Narratives of Vietnam, and
Jerry Lembcke’s The Spitting Image:
Myth, Memory, and the Legacy of
Vietnam.
BREANNE ROBERTSON

The Role of the Royal Navy in South America,
1920–1970, by Jon Wise. London: Bloomsbury,
2014. 288 pages. $122.

Although arguably not a very enticing
title for American naval professionals,
this small, hardback book is nonetheless
well worth their time. The author’s aim
is to illustrate the contribution that the
maritime service can make to a nation’s
foreign policy in peacetime, and in
particular to the health of its shipbuilding and defense exports. While the
book obviously showcases the fortunes
of twentieth-century Great Britain, the
points it makes are broadly transferable
and increasingly relevant in this era of
growing emphasis on seamless intergovernmental cooperation. Besides, the
subject matter is refreshing: How often
among naval monographs do you find
a top-notch scholarly investigation into
that most mundane and yet ubiquitous
naval mission of “presence” or “showing the flag”? Naval officers are quick
to extol the virtues of these activities
in conversation, but few actually can
substantiate their claims. This book
goes some way toward filling that gap.
The book has its origins in a PhD dissertation on the history of the relationship
between the Royal Navy and its Chilean
counterpart. As such it limits the focus
to a manageable analysis of the presence
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mission in a particular theater at a given
time, while at the same time allowing a
useful extension into the broader topic
of naval diplomacy throughout the
Americas as a backdrop. The work begins with a survey of the extant scholarship on showing the flag—a term that the
author explains is really too broad to be
useful—before moving chronologically
through the decades of the last century.
By and large the chapters flow logically
into one another, although the comparative chapter on U.S. postwar defense
plans (chapter 6) seems something of an
outlier, particularly in view of the title.
The research is excellent and uses a wide
variety of contemporary official sources
and established scholarly works. The
author is an academic researcher and
does not appear to have had any naval
experience, although he has done his
homework in gathering the appropriate
naval opinions. The work forms a
concise and usable package. (However,
from a publishing point of view, the
physical ink used in the printing leaves
a lot to be desired. In the reviewer’s
copy, even the action of fingering a page
lifted the print right off the paper!)
The book’s overall message is that, while
the Royal Navy was suffering through a
stretch of undeniable decline throughout
the period, even in its heyday the
service never really enjoyed a position
of complete, influential dominance
on the South American continent.
Furthermore, by being proactive and
focusing its efforts on areas where
success was more likely, it managed to
maintain a surprising level of influence
for far longer than one might have
imagined in what was, after all, very
much a secondary theater for the
United Kingdom. To this end, the book
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showcases the importance of the attaché
in linking naval and diplomatic efforts,
as well as the enormous value of offering
educational experiences and exchanges
to foreign officers, thereby sowing the
seed corn for future cooperation.
Interestingly, it also demonstrates that
even in the absence of such schemes,
the Royal Navy leadership could and
did lead the impetus for change, with
surprising success—as evidenced by the
impact of the 1970s “Group Operating”
concept, which enhanced the prestige
value of the navy’s visits ashore while at
the same time sustaining its skills and
capabilities at sea. The navy benefited in
that its “blue-water” skills were preserved far longer than would have
been possible otherwise, and defense
sales benefited from the showcasing
of those skills. It truly was a “win-win”
development. In conclusion, this is a
worthwhile read for anyone interested
in the broad topic of naval diplomacy
overseas or defense sales in particular.
ANGUS ROSS

The Warrior, Military Ethics and Contemporary
Warfare: Achilles Goes Asymmetrical, by Pauline
M. Kaurin. Surrey, U.K.: Ashgate, 2014. 154 pages.
$149.95.

Pauline Kaurin is associate professor
of philosophy at Pacific Lutheran
University, specializing in the just war
tradition and military ethics. For this
volume, Kaurin developed her research
during time at the U.S. Naval Academy
and U.S. Military Academy and in
dialogue with academic colleagues in
the International Society for Military
Ethics. This volume examines the ethical
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complexities facing the modern warrior
engaged in asymmetrical warfare (AW).
In the introduction, Kaurin begins
with a thorough discussion of the term
warrior, giving it a meaning distinct
from soldier, sailor, airman, or any other
military operator. To give meaning to
the warrior concept, Kaurin reaches
back to ancient Greek mythology: she
finds Achilles, of Homer’s Iliad, to be
the “touchstone” for the ethical warrior.
Kaurin does not see Achilles as the perfect example of a warrior; instead, Achilles exemplifies the military professional’s
existential essence in war and personifies
warrior virtues, resilience, and prowess.
Even though Achilles fought his wars
in antiquity, Kaurin sees Achilles as
relevant to the AW of the current era.
Examined through the lens of jus in
bello, how do we fight like Achilles and
how do we fight against Achilles? The
volume addresses the moral education
of the warrior to engage and interpret
better the unconventional conflicts
that present ethical challenges, as
well as ethical impediments that are
contrary to jus in bello. How do we
equip the warrior to engage ethically complex weapons technology and
changing asymmetrical conflict?
Kaurin argues for a systematic examination of the ethical challenges posed by
autonomous weapons and AW. What are
the ethics of the strategies and tactics
of each of the two sides in AW? One
side may use torture against captives,
whether combatants or noncombatants,
while the other side chooses not to
reciprocate owing to countervailing
moral norms, contrary public opinion,
and lack of political will. How does
the warrior question, think, and
respond to such moral dichotomies
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faced in AW? Kaurin’s premise is that
moral education must address AW
within the scope of jus in bello.
The focus on AW stems from two
points. The first is a mind-set fixed
on a conventional-war theory that
understands asymmetrical conflict as
part of conventional warfare. A second
point is that AW requires new challenges
to ethical thinking that are counter
to that associated with conventional
war. When will serious ethical thought
be given to the changing nature of
war, which confronts the norms of
traditional war between nations?
Kaurin’s thoughts and observations
go beyond AW. She identifies the
deeper nuances of moral asymmetry,
as defined by Michael Gross and Rob
Thorton. The adversary’s failure to
practice reciprocity undermines the
moral norms, strategy, and tactics of
the generally stronger opponent. With
disproportional impact, the effect
represents a symbolic and ideological
stance against the stronger opponent.
Of the ethical questions Kaurin
poses throughout the book, some are
being contemplated already, while
others are harder to engage because
the moral scope involved cannot be
brought into focus yet. She contends
that understanding the full scope of the
ethical issues requires getting into the
hearts and minds of the adversary; yet
often it is the adversary who artfully
gets into the hearts and minds, and
the social fabric, of the opponent.
Kaurin contends that if warriors are to
engage in asymmetrical moral conflict,
they must have courage. Yet the technological development of weapons means
that the physical distance between
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opponents is growing, so it takes less
courage to go to war. Achilles had the
courage to fight face-to-face, taking
risks and facing danger directly.
For many, distancing oneself from
danger—even the risk of danger—by
using technology imposes a fundamental
weakness on the modern warrior amid
the challenges he faces. Kaurin presents
a detailed analysis of courage in an
asymmetrical context, with a prescription for developing courageous warriors.
Another moral attribute that Kaurin
sees as essential to the warrior ethos is
loyalty. This loyalty is built on leadership and trust and is a foundation of
the profession of arms. Referencing
the Illiad, she compares the loyalty of
Achilles, the traditional warrior, with
that of Hector, the contemporary,
professional warrior. A strategy for
training warriors for loyalty is laid
out. In addition to excellent military
ethics literature references, Kaurin uses
film to illustrate key ethical points.
The combatant/noncombatant
distinction must be made clear for the
soldier considering jus in bello. Kaurin
proposes a five-level gradation of power
and threat, from highest to lowest:
• uniformed combat personnel
• unconventional belligerents
• those provisionally hostile
• neutral or nonhostile noncombatants
• vulnerable noncombatants
Discerning the appropriate category
of combatant/noncombatant would
determine the appropriate level of force.
Such a moral model of ascertaining
the threat level would equip the soldier
better in the ethics of jus in bello.
Kaurin’s thoughts are a contribution
to the literature on the higher level of
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moral thinking for military leaders. She
does not shy away from the conundrums
the warrior faces. To maintain an
ethical edge in asymmetrical warfare,
military ethics must be embedded into
the culture of the profession of arms.
THOMAS E. CREELY

The General vs. the President: MacArthur and Truman at the Brink of Nuclear War, by H. W. Brands.
New York: Doubleday, 2016. 448 pages. $30.

The relief of General of the Army
Douglas MacArthur by President Harry
S. Truman remains one of the most
controversial and debated wartime
command decisions made in the
military history of the United States.
By April 1951, Douglas MacArthur was
at the peak of his game as a military
leader. His public pressing to widen the
war in Korea, in direct contradiction
to the intent of his president, and his
public statements to that end that led
to his dismissal still fuel debate today.
H. W. Brands gives depth to the tale of
MacArthur versus Truman by including the complexities that existed in
the Korean conflict and its Cold War
context, when a U.S.-led “free world”
was engaged in a global struggle against
Soviet-led Communism (and especially
Soviet interest in Central Europe). As
the fighting in Korea continued, official
Washington, and the Pentagon in
particular, worried that the war effort
was tying down more and more U.S.
military resources—worries that
fueled further concerns that Moscow
might see the United States stretched
militarily and unable to defend
Central Europe adequately.
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Brands highlights another lesser-known
aspect of the Korean War: MacArthur’s
desire to bring Chinese Nationalist
forces into the fight. Truman and the
Joint Chiefs, knowing how this could
antagonize Mao’s China and possibly
widen the war, did not view the idea
favorably. Truman and the Joint Chiefs
were not convinced that Chiang
Kai-shek’s corrupt and recently defeated
forces would prove more of an advantage
than a burden to the fight in Korea.
MacArthur also clearly chafed at what
he perceived to be Truman’s hesitancy
in fighting Communism. Truman, in
turn, remained focused on the Communist threat to Central Europe and
U.S. commitments to its European allies,
all the while trying to balance resisting
Communist aggression in Korea against
preventing the conflict from widening.

presidential nomination. Yet, not
desiring to campaign and growing ever
more shrill in his speeches, MacArthur
quickly doomed his potential candidacy
to oblivion. His seeming advocacy for
the use of nuclear weapons in Korea
gave civilian and military leaders further
pause, particularly when he suggested
“sowing of fields of suitable radio-active
material” in theater. Interestingly, it
was President-elect Eisenhower who
later broke the peace talk deadlock
by intimating his openness to using
nuclear weapons against the Chinese.

Yet the conflict in Korea did widen
when Chinese forces entered the fray
in November 1950—an escalation
that caught MacArthur off guard.
Only a month earlier, in his famous
meeting with Truman at Wake
Island, he categorically had dismissed
Chinese intervention as a concern.

Perhaps the most damning part of
the MacArthur story is the general’s
testimony before the Senate Armed
Services and Foreign Relations Committees upon his relief of command
and forced return from Japan. The
testimony, which Brands recounts in
great detail, makes for some of the best
reading. MacArthur tries to live up to
his reputation, yet appears to be out of
his league before inquisitive senators.
He ultimately loses what support he
had from Republicans, who, while no
fans of Truman, in the end opted not
to cast their lots with MacArthur.

The central element of the MacArthurTruman controversy proved to be the
persona of Douglas MacArthur himself.
Having lived and fought in the Pacific
since 1937 (and not having returned to
the United States until his relief in 1951),
MacArthur had a self-described faith in
his understanding of the “Asian mind.”
By 1951 MacArthur, then seventy-one,
had lost touch with his country, which
had changed considerably in the thirteen
years since he had been there last. Believing he could speak for the American
people, MacArthur allowed a draft effort
to go forward for the 1952 Republican

A few aspects of the book did prove
distracting. Detailed maps of the
Korean Peninsula showing the many
stages of the Korean War would have
added to the reader’s understanding of
the conflict but are absent. Further, a
glitch in binding resulted in the Korean
Peninsula map that was included on the
inside cover being upside down. The
reviewer contacted the publisher via
e-mail and, although acknowledged,
was not responded to. And on page
329 the author’s passage “MacArthur’s
prediction that by January 1950 the
victory would be so complete” is clearly
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a misprint, because North Korea did not
invade South Korea until June 1950.
These items are minor and easily
corrected in a future edition. What
remains still is a powerful book that
goes into great detail, benefiting
from the storytelling ability of H. W.
Brands. We hope that a civil-military
conflict between a towering figure like
MacArthur and a sitting U.S. president
is unlikely to reoccur. Yet the story
remains a valid one today, with its lessons on the reach of military power in
a democracy, the role of the president
in setting national policy, and the role
of civilian oversight of military power.
DAVID L. TESKA

The Pacific War and Contingent Victory: Why
Japanese Defeat Was Not Inevitable, by Michael
W. Myers. Lawrence: Univ. Press of Kansas, 2015.
208 pages. $34.95.

The Pacific War and Contingent Victory
is “an exercise in the elucidation of
terms”—an exercise necessary to
determine whether the Empire of
Japan could have avoided defeat at the
hands of the United States and its allies.
The focus on “terms” is important,
as precision and clarity are vital to
Professor Michael Myers’s effort to
challenge the near-universal acceptance
of the idea that Japanese defeat was
inevitable. On the contrary, Myers
argues that there were several points
in the war where the arc of history was
subject to change, given a different mix
of luck, skill, will, or strategy. Myers’s
book takes aim at British historian H.
P. Willmott—a leading proponent of
the inevitability school—and Willmott’s
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assertion that since “the defeat of
Japan was assured” no single battle or
campaign can be considered “decisive.”
The Pacific War and Contingent
Victory challenges this conventional
view that inherent industrial, financial,
and demographic shortcomings all
but guaranteed Japanese defeat.
Myers is also careful to argue that,
while the Japanese could have avoided
defeat, this does not mean necessarily
that they ultimately could have gained
victory. Rather, Japan might have
realized outcomes short of actual defeat,
such as an armistice preserving some
of the gains made early in the war, a
return to the status quo ante bellum, or
even a negotiated surrender that left
Japan more intact than it would be when
it ultimately did surrender in 1945.
Myers’s challenge to Willmott and the
rest of the proponents of inevitable
Japanese defeat is built on an insistence
on precise terms: as he explains, all that
is required is to show that there was the
slightest chance of a Japanese victory,
however long the odds or improbable
the required chain of events. If, even
under the most remote of conditions,
a different outcome could have occurred, then the inevitability argument
is defeated. Myers then argues that if
defeat was not a certainty, then one
or more events—be they battles or
campaigns or just a moment of good
or ill fortune—had to be decisive. It is
difficult, perhaps even impossible, to
argue with Myers’s logic. His position
is somewhat similar to that of a lawyer
defending the owners of a carnival who
offer a commonly found midway game
involving tossing softballs into milk cans
for prizes. All the lawyer has to do is
show that it is possible for the softball to
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go into the can, even if the likelihood of
that happening is as close to zero as one
can get, and no one ever wins a prize.
Myers produces ample evidence to prove
his point. He notes that even Willmott
himself acknowledges that a German
victory in Europe could have enabled
Japan to achieve something other than
defeat in the Pacific. If the avatar of
inevitability admits the possibility of
an alternative outcome, what else is
needed to carry the argument? However,
the clarification that Japanese defeat
was nearly inevitable versus simply
inevitable is a distinction without a
difference. If this were all there was to
Myers’s book, it would be scant reward
for the cost of purchase or the time
spent reading it. Luckily there is more.

Japan might have avoided defeat.
These include a United States willing
to settle for a negotiated conclusion
in the face of mounting casualties
and war weariness. Greater success
against Australia, which Myers argues
could have been achieved, perhaps
combined with a successful invasion
and occupation of Hawaii, might have
been another means to a different end.
In sum, Myers’s book—which has
been used in the Naval War College’s
curricular case on the Pacific theater
in the Second World War—by focusing
on war’s contingent nature, illustrates
well the oft-noted maxim that in war
the enemy truly does “get a vote.”
RICHARD J. NORTON

The Pacific War and Contingent Victory
identifies a number of ways by which
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